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The	EU	referendum	was	gerrymandered
In	an	extract	from	his	new	book,	Democracy	and	Its	Crisis,	AC	Grayling	(New	College	of	the
Humanities)	argues	that	MPs	were	made	fully	aware	the	referendum	result	was	non-binding.
In	addition,	the	franchise	deliberately	excluded	groups	with	a	direct	interest	in	the	result.	Only
37%	of	those	eligible	to	vote	in	the	referendum	backed	Brexit.	The	EU	referendum,	he
concludes,	was	gerrymandered.
The	Brexit	referendum	is	an	example	of	how	the	constitutional	and	political	order	of	the	UK	is	in
a	highly	questionable	state.	Without	over-exaggerating,	it	is	arguable	that	the	EU	referendum	itself	and	the
government’s	subsequent	actions	resemble	something	like	a	coup	–	a	strong	claim;	but	allow	the	following	details
to	speak	for	themselves.
The	referendum	franchise	excluded	–	after	discussion	of	the	matter	prior	to	introduction	of	the	EU	Referendum
Bill	in	Parliament	–	16-	and	17-year-olds,	expatriate	British	citizens	who	had	lived	abroad	for	more	than	a	certain
number	of	years,	and	EU	citizens	resident	in	the	UK	and	paying	their	taxes	there.	It	would	seem	obvious	that	all
three	groups	should	have	been	included	as	having	the	most	material	interest	in	the	outcome	of	the	vote.	In	the
franchise	for	the	Scottish	independence	referendum	of	2014,	16-	and	17-year-olds	had	the	vote	and	so	did	EU
citizens	resident	in	Scotland.	No	threshold	was	specified	for	the	outcome	of	the	referendum,	unlike	the	1979
Scottish	devolution	referendum	which	required	that	40%	of	the	entire	electorate	should	be	in	favour	for	any
change	to	take	place.
Campaigning	in	a	referendum	he	never	wanted	to	call	nor	expected	to	lose	…	David	Cameron.
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In	Briefing	Paper	07212	(pdf	download)	published	on	3	June	2015	all	MPs	and	members	of	the	House	of	Lords
were	told	that	the	referendum	was	advisory	only,	and	would	not	be	binding	on	Parliament	or	government.	This
point	was	iterated	viva	voce	by	the	Minister	for	Europe	in	the	debate	in	the	House	of	Commons	later	that	month.
This	was	the	reason	given	for	not	including	a	threshold	and	for	not	extending	the	franchise	appropriately.	The
outcome	was	that	37%	of	the	restricted	electorate	given	the	franchise	for	the	referendum	voted	to	leave	the	EU.
This	outcome	is	by	any	standards	insufficient	to	justify	a	constitutional	change	so	significant	as	the	UK’s	exiting
the	EU.	There	is	scarcely	any	civilised	state	in	the	world	where	a	simple	majority,	let	alone	a	small	one,	would
permit	this:	for	such	a	change,	a	supermajority	would	be	required,	of	60%	or	66%	either	of	votes	cast	or	the	entire
electorate.	Yet	a	small	minority	of	actual	votes	cast,	representing	37%	of	the	total	electorate,	was	taken	by	the
politicians	in	favour	of	Brexit	as	not	merely	justifying	but	mandating	the	actions	they	took	following	the
referendum.	There	is	therefore	nowhere	near	enough	justification	or	legitimacy	for	a	Brexit.
The	Brexit	ministry	empanelled	after	the	referendum	sought	to	trigger	Article	50	of	the	Lisbon	Treaty	notifying	EU
partners	of	an	intention	to	leave	the	EU,	without	a	parliamentary	debate.	It	had	to	be	taken	to	court	to	oblige	it	to
respect	the	constitutional	sovereignty	of	Parliament.	In	response,	and	arguably	in	contempt	both	of	what	is	meant
to	be	Parliament’s	role	and	of	the	intention	of	the	Supreme	Court	judgment,	the	government	introduced	a	very
short	Bill	of	a	few	lines	to	hasten	through	Parliament,	with	restricted	time	to	discuss	it,	and	a	full	threeline	whip	to
ensure	that	its	own	MPs,	whatever	their	real	views,	would	vote	for	triggering	Article	50	despite	any	argument,
facts,	considerations	or	warnings	that	might	come	up	in	the	hurried	debate.	The	purport	of	Briefing	Paper	07212
returns	to	relevance	here.	It	says	in	section	5	that	the	referendum	is	non-binding,	advisory,	consultative;	and
section	6	points	out	that	if	there	were	to	be	any	suggestion	otherwise,	there	would	need	to	be	a	supermajority
requirement.	In	the	House	of	Commons	in	the	debate	on	the	EU	Referendum	Bill	the	Minister	for	Europe,	David
Lidington,	told	the	House	that	‘the	legislation	is	about	holding	a	vote;	it	makes	no	provision	for	what	follows.	The
referendum	is	advisory’	(Hansard	for	16	June	2015).	Yet	the	Brexit	ministry	has	chosen	to	treat	the	referendum
outcome	as	binding	and	mandating,	in	defiance	of	the	explicit	nature	of	the	Referendum	Act	itself.
This	and	the	inconsistencies	of	this	referendum	with	other	referenda	raise	a	serious	question	of	constitutional
propriety.	To	arrange	things	as	convenient	for	a	given	occasion	–	in	effect	making	them	up	as	one	goes	along	–
without	any	question	of	conformity	to	a	due	process	and	a	propriety	of	constitutional	order,	throws	the	legitimacy
of	the	process	into	doubt.	This	applies	in	a	major	way	to	the	EU	referendum	in	2016.
It	is	relevant	to	recall	that	the	2016	EU	referendum	was	not	necessitated	by	any	crisis	in	the	EU	or	in	the	UK’s
relations	with	its	EU	partners;	there	were	no	threats	or	problems	arising	from	EU	membership,	other	than	those
alleged	(and	alleged	for	over	40	years	of	anti-EU	activism)	by	‘Eurosceptics’	and	politicians	on	the	right	of	the
Conservative	Party	and	UKIP.	It	was	in	fact	an	effort	by	the	then	leadership	of	the	Conservative	Party	to	stifle
temporarily	a	long-standing	quarrel	within	that	party.	During	the	previous	coalition	government	David	Cameron
promised	a	referendum,	against	the	advice	of	his	senior	colleagues,	to	silence	the	far	right	of	his	party,	which	was
engaged	in	its	usual	procedure	of	making	life	difficult	as	they	had	done	for	every	Conservative	Prime	Minister
since	1972.	Cameron	almost	certainly	did	not	expect	to	win	the	election	of	2015,	still	less	with	an	outright
majority.	He	had	offered	the	referendum	as	one	might	offer	a	bone	to	quieten	barking	dogs.	When	he	won	a
majority	in	the	election,	he	was	obliged	to	honour	the	promise.	Neither	he	nor	anyone	else,	including	the	pro-
Brexit	camp,	expected	Leave	to	‘win’,	so	he	culpably	allowed	the	Brexit	faction	to	arrange	the	franchise	in	a	way
that	best	suited	them	–	this	being	the	exclusion	of	sixteen-	to	seventeen-year-olds	(Cameron	subsequently	said
that	insisting	on	their	inclusion	would	have	caused	too	much	trouble	with	his	right	wing),	expatriates,	and	EU
taxpayers	in	the	UK,	who	between	them	would	have	assured	a	significant	Remain	majority,	a	fact	the	Brexiters
well	understood.
Deliberate	restriction	of	the	franchise	is	gerrymandering:	the	EU	referendum	was	gerrymandered.
This	post	represents	the	views	of	the	author	and	not	those	of	the	Brexit	blog,	nor	the	LSE.	It	is	an	edited	extract
from	A	C	Graylng’s	new	book	DEMOCRACY	AND	ITS	CRISIS,	out	now	from	Oneworld	in	hardback,	£14.99.
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